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The State Sovereignty Doctrine Since
NationalLeagueof Cities v. Usery:
A New Constitutional Interpretation
Under the Commerce Clause
I.

Introduction

The constitutional history of minimum wage legislation in the United
States reflects the changes in philosophical complexion that the United
States Supreme Court has experienced in the last seventy-five years. When
the Court was swayed by the precepts of laissez faire economics and "dual
federalism," minimum wage legislation was invalidated; when the Court

was influenced by Keynesian thought and "new federalism," minimum
wage laws were sanctioned. Today the Court appears to be shifting away
from a philosophy favoring a strong central government to one advocating
states' rights. This change, unsurprisingly, manifested itself in National
League of Cities v. Usery, which struck down the application of the

Federal Wage and Hours Law to state and local governments. 2
National League of Cities marked the first time since the Great

Depression that the Court had invalidated a major piece of economic
legislation 3 and is curiously reminiscent of that era in our history before and
during the early years of the Great Depression when the Court viewed
remedial economic legislation with a jaundiced eye and erected a constitu-

tional stonewall to block minimum wage laws. 4 This comment is premised
upon the idea that Supreme Court decisions are "translative of the social
I. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
2. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1965) (originally enacted as
Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060) [hereinafter referred to as the FLSA]. The FLSA
was made applicable to the states by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Act of
April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 58. See note 107 and accompanying text infra.
This Act contains minimum wage, overtime pay and child labor provisions that apply to
employees engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce or in
an enterprise that operates for those purposes. The FLSA also establishes a floor for wage
scales throughout the economy because, generally speaking, when the minimum wage is
increased, labor organizations press for wage increases. Thus "the earnings of millions of
American workers are keyed directly to the Federal minimum wage." Hearings to Amend the
Fair Labors Standards Act Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959) (testimony of George Meany, President,
AFL-CIO), quoted in S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in [19611U. S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1620, 1679 (minority views).
3. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
4. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.

philosophies, outlooks, and predilections of members of the bench." 5
Accordingly, it surveys the constitutional history of minimum wage
legislation in the United States against the backdrop of the shifting
philosphical leanings of the Court. National League of Cities is critically
analyzed and its implications for federal regulation of state and local
government activities in general are considered.
II.

Shifting Judicial Philosophies and Early Minimum Wage Laws

A.

Judicial Philosophy in Perspective: 1800 to 1885

The Supreme Court's history of judicial review of legislation can be
divided into five philosophical periods, 6 the last of which has just begun.
During the first period, from 1800 to 1835, labeled for convenience the
"Marshall Era," the predominant concept that was applied to legislation
affecting the states was that a federal system is one in which the individual
units of government, the states, are subordinate to the national
government.7

The "Marshall Era" ended, as have all the Court's philosophical
periods, with a change in the Court's composition. Within twenty-two
months of Marshall's death in 1835 the membership of the Court was

increased from seven to nine justices, six of whom were appointed during
that interregnum. 8 This increase and turnover in the bench's membership
effectuated a reversal from the Marshallian theory of national supremacy to
the prevailing popular notion of states' rights. This period-1835 to

1885-can be called the "Era of Dual Federalism," a theory of federalism
which provided that the two levels of government-national and state-

are sovereign within their mutually exclusive spheres and that the enumerated national powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce,
could not be used to govern the activities that were said to be reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment. 9 Edward S. Corwin noted that the central
5. E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 96 (1938). Corwin also stated that "constitutional law . . . is derived chiefly not from the constitutional document but from outside
the Court has from the first exercised a highly
ideas and theories, with regard to which .
selective function." Id. at 93.
6. The five philosophical periods, as further discussed in the text, are the "Marshall
Era," the "Era of Dual Federalism," the "Laissez-faire Era," the "Era of New Federalism," and the "State Sovereignty Era." For an extended discussion of these first three
periods see id. at 98-128.
7. Id. at 98. Corwin summarized this concept of federalism as follows:
1. The Constitution, being derived from the American people, is to be
interpreted solely from the point of view of securing to them the fullest benefit of its
provisions, a fact emphasized by the 'necessary and proper' clause. 2. State power
as such is no ingredient of national power and sets no independent limit thereto, a
fact made clear by the 'supremacy' clause. 3. The chief role of the Supreme Court is
that of ultimate organ of the national supremacy, and its construction of the
Constitution and laws of the United States is binding on the states in all cases
whatsoever. 4. The Constitution was intended to endure for ages to come, and the
Court's function of interpreting it involves accordingly the corollary responsibility
of adapting it to the various crises of human affairs.
Id. at 98-99.
8. Id. at 102.
9. The term "dual federalism" is credited to Edward S. Corwin who traced its origin to
a letter written by James Madison to J. C. Cabell in which Madison asserted that the power to

theme of dual federalism was "federal equilibrium .

.

. which

signifies in

practical effect that the distribution of powers between the National
Government and the states which exists at any particularmoment ought to
be treated as something permanent; and that the main reason for judicial
0
,review is to secure this permanency."'
The Laissez-FaireEra on the Bench
Dual federalism also played a large role in the Supreme Court's next
philosophical period, the "Laissez-Faire Era." As America became increasingly industrialized the major issue confronting the Court shifted from
states' rights versus national power to government versus business, and the
point of view from which the Court approached this latter issue was the
laissez-faire theory of political economy." It was during this period-1 885
to 1935-that state and federal efforts to establish minimum rates of pay
were frustrated by the laissez-faire court.12
B.

1. Freedom of Contract and Dual Federalism.--Earlyminimum
wage legislation in the United States was blocked by two rationales that
complemented the laissez-faire theory of political economy-due process
and dual federalism. The laissez-faire Court employed the due process
clause, and, in particular, the freedom to contract, which was said to inhere
therein, as a screening device to filter out state and congressional regulations of the employment relationship that a majority of the Court regarded
as intruding too far into the affairs of business.
In the late 1800's and early 1900's the states and Congress passed
legislation that limited the number of hours that workers could be employed in certain occupations or in the performance of government
contracts. 3 This limited intrusion into the employment relationship received general judicial approval, even though it abridged the freedom to
contract, because the Court viewed it as a reasonable exercise of the power
regulate interstate commerce "was intended as a negative and preventive provision against
injustice among the states themselves, rather than as apowerto be used for positive purposes
of the General Government, in which alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged.
And it will be safer to leave the power with this key to it .... "Letter from James Madison to
J. C. Cabell, Feb. 13, 1829, quoted in E. S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES
RIGHTS 24-25 (1936).
Corwin's dual federalism has been summarized into the following four propositions:
(1) the national government is one of enumerated powers only; (2) the purposes
which the national government may constitutionally promote are few; (3) the two
levels of government-national and state-are 'sovereign' and hence 'equal' within
their respective spheres; and (4) the relation of the two levels to each other is one of

tension rather than collaboration or cooperation.
P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970, at 59 (1970).
Significantly, one of the characteristics of dual federalism was the enlarged supervisory role

of the Court in relation to national legislative powers. E. CORWIN, supra at 39.
10.
II.

E. CORWIN, supra note 5, at 103.
Laissez-faire literally means let alone. Laissez-faire economics contemplate free-

dom from governmental regulation.
12. For a general discussion of the early history of the wage-hour movement see H.
WECHT, WAGE-HOUR LAW COVERAGE 4-20 (1951); 15 CONG. DIG. 258-65 (1936).

13. The various congressional and state enactments are discussed in H. WECHT, supra
note 12, at 9-17.

to protect the health and welfare of the citizenry. ' 4 Later in the 1900's the
states enacted minimum wage legislation, applicable to women and
minors, purportedly as public health regulations. 15 In 1918, following the
states' lead, Congress passed a law that guaranteed to women and minors
working in the District of Columbia a wage adequate to maintain their

health and morals.16 This wage law was declared unconstitutional by a
divided Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital 7 on the ground that it

authorized an impermissible governmental interference with the freedom
to contract. The United States had argued that the "hours cases," 18 which
had held that government regulation of the hours of labor was a reasonable
restraint of the freedom to contract, were controlling. The Court disagreed,
distinguishing those cases on the basis that they did not concern the
"heart" of the employment contract, "the amount of wages to be paid and

received." 9 In short, a majority of five justices fabricated a constitutional
legislation that was
distinction between hours and wages to invalidate
20

inimical to their shared notion of laissez-faire.
The laissez-faire Court also resorted to dual federalism to thwart
congressional efforts to regulate the conditions of employment under the
commerce clause. 2' Thus, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,22 federal legislation
prohibiting the transportation in interstate commerce of goods made in a
14. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1916) (sustaining Oregon statute restricting
hours for all persons employed in any mill, factory or manufacturing establishment); Bosley
v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (sustaining California statute regulating hours of nurses);
Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (sustaining California statute regulating hours of female
hotel employees); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (sustaining Massachusetts
statute limiting the hours of labor in factories for women against due process objection);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustaining Oregon maximum hours statute applicable
only to women and minors); Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907) (federal statute
restricting hours worked in the performance of public works contracts sustained); Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (Utah statute limiting hours of work in hazardous occupations
sustained). Contra, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York
legislation restricting hours of work in bakeries).
15. See, e.g., Minimum Wage Act for Women and Children of the State of Washington,
Wash. Laws of 1913, ch. 174, as amended, 49 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 12.010-.230 (1962).
Other states passing minimum wage laws for women and minors were Massachusetts,
California, Colorado, Minnesota, Nebraska, Utah, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Arizona,
Arkansas, Kansas, North Dakota and Texas. 15 CONG. DIG. 260 (1936). The first minimum
wage laws in the United States were patterned after New Zealand and Australian enactments.
For a general discussion of the operation of the Australian minimum wage scheme see
Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order, 29 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1915).
16. Act of Sept. 19, 1918, ch. 174, 40 Stat. 960.
17. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
18. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
19. 261 U.S. at 554.
20. Freedom of contract thus became a laissez-faire weapon to combat government
regulation of wages. See Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657(1927), percuriam;
Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925), per curiam (invalidating statutes establishing
minimum wages for women); Chas. Wolff Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923) (invalidating Kansas statute requiring compulsory arbitration to determine minimum
wages); Topeka Laundry Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 119 Kan. 12,237 P. 1041 (1925)
(invalidating statute providing minimum wage for women); Stevenson v. St. Clair, 161 Minn.
444, 201 N.W. 629 (1925) (invalidating minimum wage law insofar as it applied to women but
sustaining its application to minors).
21. For a general discussion on the influence of laissez-faire economics on dual
federalism see B. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 46-48 (1955); Stern, The

Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946(pts 1-2), 59 HARV. L. REV. 645,883
(1946).
22. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (commonly referred to as the Child Labor Case).

factory which employed minors under a specified age was invalidated as an
unconstitutional encroachment upon a field reserved to the states-the
regulation of the manner in which goods were manufactured. 23 As one
commentator noted, "[t]he desire to maintain dual federalism as a necessary complement of laissez-faire was the primary motive behind Supreme
Court decisions like Hammerv. Dagenhartwhich appeared unduly to limit
the authority of the national government." 24
Dual federalism endured through the first years of the Great Depression. It was again evident in 1935 in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States 25 in which the Court invalidated the National Industrial
Recovery Act.26 The NIRA had, inter alia, authorized the President to
establish minimum rates of pay and maximum hours of work for certain
industries. 27 The Court characterized the Act's wage and hour provisions
as a regulation of manufacture, an area that was clearly reserved to the
states.28
The Court again relied on dual federalism in Carter v. CarterCoal
Co. 29 to invalidate the Guffey Coal Act 30 on the basis of its wage and hour
provisions. In Carter the Court conceded that the power to regulate
commerce extended to those activities that "directly" affected commerce.
The Court reasoned, however, that employment conditions had only an
"indirect" impact on commerce and were therefore beyond national
31
power however inevitable such effect is, and whatever its extent.
Thus a majority of the Court established a constitutional distinction
between activities that "directly" and "indirectly" affected commerce in
order to support decisions comporting with their laissez-faire philosophy
and their view of the national-state power distribution.
C.

The Shift Away from Laissez-Faire

1. Freedom to ContractRationale Discarded.-The severity and
persistence of the economic dislocations attending the Great Depression
eventually discredited the laissez-faire concept that the least government is
the best government and, consequently, undermined the constitutional
23.

Corwin asserted that this decision created "a realm of no-power . . .the very

Utopia of Laissez-Faireism." E. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 99 (1941),

quoted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 47. While the states were precluded from regulating
wages because such regulation abrogated the freedom to contract, Congress could not
regulate wages because the conditions of employment were reserved to the states! Corwin
described the period in which The Child Labor Case was decided as "the era of laissezfaireism on the Bench." E. CORWIN, supra note 9,at 253.
24. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 47-48.
25. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
26. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 [hereinafter referred to as the NiRA].
27. Id.§ 3,at198.
28. 295 U.S. at 548. The NIRA's code-making authority was also declared unconstitutional as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority. Id.at 541. The Court thereby
halted the New Deal efforts to put minimum wage laws into effect by indirection under the
general authority given the President under the NIRA. 15 CONG. DIG. 262 (1936).
29. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
30. Act of August 30, 1935, ch. 824, §§ 1-23, 49 Stat. 991.
31. 298 U.S. at308-09.

principles of freedom of contract and dual federalism. Freedom of contract
was abandoned as a bar to minimum wage legislation by a five to four vote
32
West CoastHotel concerned
in 1937 in West CoastHotel Co. v. Parrish.
33
the Washington minimum wage statute, which was similar to the one
invalidated in Adkins v. Children'sHospital34 in that it also required the
payment to women and minors of a wage sufficient to cover the necessary
costs of living and to maintain health. Nevertheless, the majority asserted
35
that the rationale in Adkins could no longer be considered authoritative:
"The validity of the distinction made by the Court [in Adkins] between a
minimum wage and a maximum of hours in limiting liberty of contract was
especially challenged [by the dissenting justices in Adkins]. That challenge persists and is without any satisfactory answer." 36 Chief Justice
Hughes cited as controlling the "hours" cases, 37 which had sustained
governmental regulation of hours against the contention that such regulation violated the freedom to contract, and held that
[t]he legislature of the state was clearly entitled to consider the
situation of women in employment, the fact that they are in the
class receiving the least pay, and their bargaining power is
relatively weak, and that they are the ready victims of those who
would take advantage of their necessitous circumstances. The
Legislature was entitled to adopt measures to reduce the evils of
the 'sweating system,' the exploiting of workers at wages so low
as to be insufficient to meet the bare cost of living. . . . The
adoption of similar requirements by many states evidences a
deepseated conviction both as to the presence of the evil and as
to the means adapted to check it. Legislative response to that
conviction cannot be regarded
as arbitrary or capricious and that
38
is all we have to decide.

2.

The Repudiation of Dual Federalism.-The overruling of Ad-

kins signalled the beginning of the end of the Court's laissez-faire
attachment. The winding down of the Court's "laissez-faire era" con32. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). West Coast Hotel was decided just one year after the Court, by
a 5-4 vote, had sustained a New York Court of Appeals ruling that New York's minimum wage
law was unconstitutional on the basis of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(see note 17 and accompanying text supra). Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S.
587 (1936). Speaking of Adkins, Justice Butler, writing for the majority in Morehead, stated
that -[t]he decision and the reasoning upon which it rests clearly show that the State is without
power by any form of legislation to prohibit, change or nullify contracts between employers
and adult women workers as to the amount of wages to be paid." Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
In West Coast Hotel, Chief Justice Hughes, who had dissented in Morehead, disregarded this
sweeping language and cast aside the Morehead precedent by asserting that the New York
Court of Appeals invalidation of the New York act had prevented a thorough reconsideration
of Adkins.
This reasoning permitted Justice Roberts, who had voted with the majority in Morehead,
to be the swing vote in West Coast Hotel. As will be shown, however, extraneous forces
actually caused Roberts to reconsider Adkins and not a rule of judicial review. See note 47and
accompanying text infra.
33. Wash. Laws of 1913, ch. 174, as amended, 49 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
12.010-230 (1962).
34. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
35. 300 U.S. at 397.
36. Id. at 395.
37. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. The Court's rationale in the early
"hours" cases had been rejected in Adkins. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
38. 300 U.S. at 398-99.

tinued with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,39 in which a majority
upheld the Wagner Act, 4" which regulated labor-management relations,
rejecting the contention that it conflicted with the states' reserved constitutional authority to regulate production. 4 ' In sustaining the Wagner Act, the
new majority rejected the direct-indirect distinction of the laissez-faire
Court and held that
[w]hatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and
threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress
to
under the commerce clause and it is primarily for Congress
consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it.42
West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin are two of the highlights of a
"judicial revolution" 4 3 that resulted in a coup of the laissez-faire Court.
This revolution can be understood only be considering the leanings of the
individual Justices and the political and social forces that were brought to
bear on the Court during the 1930's.
Prior to West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin, the course of
Supreme Court decisions on the validity of social and economic legislation, both state and federal, had been dictated by the "laissez-faire
justices," Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, who were
generally joined by Chief Justice Hughes or Justice Roberts to form a
majority.' The laissez-faire justices were generally opposed by the "liberals," Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, 45 who in biting dissents
"portray[ed] the majority. . . as an agency setting out deliberately to use
constitutional interpretation as an instrument to curb distasteful governmental policies.'"4 But in West CoastHotel and Jones & Laughlin, Chief
Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts deserted the laissez-faire camp to form
with the liberals a "new majority" that sustained subsequent New Deal
legislation with the regularity of a stamping machine.
Two reasons are generally given for the sudden reversal in position of
the Chief Justice and Justice Roberts. 47 First, the severity and duration of
the Great Depression and the widespread labor unrest of that period may
have finally convinced the two justices that laissez-faire policies would not
produce an economic recovery. Second, President Roosevelt delivered an
ultimatum to the Bench in the form of his "Court Packing Plan," which
39. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970) (originally enacted as National Labor Relations Act,
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449).
41. 301 U.S. at 30.
42. Id. at 37, quoting Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1,37 (1923)(emphasis added).
43. For a discussion of the struggle between the "laissez-faire" justices and the
"liberal"

44.

justices see E. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).

For a general discussion of Supreme Court decisions during the 1930's see Swisher,

The Supreme Court in Transition, in FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT ANDTHE SUPREME COURT 1-16

(Cope & Krinsky ed. 1952).
45. Id.at 1.
46. Id.at 12.
47. See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy (pt.1),59 HARV. L.
REV- 645, 681-82 (1946).

said, in effect, that if the Court did not sustain New Deal legislation he
would pack it with Justices who would. Hughes and Roberts yielded to this
ultimatum and thereby ushered in a new philosophical period for the
Court-the "Era of New Federalism." The path was clear for a federal
wage and hour law.
III.

The "New Federalism"

A.

United States v. Darby: JudicialManifestation of New Federalism

In 1937 President Roosevelt urged Congress to act on the subject of
minimum wages 48 and, in 1938, it responded by enacting the "Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938." ' 9 Reflecting the nation's concern with ridding
itself of the economic hard times which had beset it, the FLSA was
designed to increase purchasing power and reduce unemployment, as well

as to insure working men and women a "fair day's pay for a fair day's
work.' '50 To achieve these ends employers covered by the Act were
required to pay their workers at least the statutory minimum wage 51 for the

first forty hours of work and one and one-half (1'/2) times their regular rate
for overtime. 52 In addition, employers were required to comply with

specified child labor standards. 5 3 Violators of the wage, hour, and child
54
labor standards were made subject to quasi-criminal and civil penalties.
48. PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1937, at 210 (1941),
quoted in H. METZ, LABOR POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, at 175 (1945). During the

1930's there had been continued agitation for minimum wage legislation. In 1933, Sidney
Hamilton, President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, sent a memorandum to the
Secretary of Labor designee, Mrs. Perkins, outlining a minimum wage law. A committee was
appointed to consider the matter, but ended deliberations when the NIRA was enacted. N. Y.
Times, June 16, 1938, at 4, col. 2. After the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in Schecter
Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), see notes 25-28 and accompanying text
supra, a number of resolutions were made proposing constitutional amendments to enable
either Congress or the states to establish a minimum wage. None of the proposals, however,
survived the 74th Congress. 15 CONG. DIG. 264, 265 (1936).
49. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676,52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
Section 2 of the FLSA, entitled "Congressional Finding and Declaration of Policy" indicated
the FLSA's commerce clause foundation. The findings were that low wages and excessive
hours burdened and obstructed commerce through labor disputes and unfair competition, and
it was Congress' avowed intent to eliminate the substandard terms of employment that
adversely affected commerce. It is evident, however, that the FLSA was a humanitarian
measure designed to eliminate the exploitation of labor. Thus, one Congresswoman described
the FLSA as "legislation that is going to mean more to the underpaid and underprivileged
people of the country than anything that has ever been enacted by the Congress .
83
CONo. REC. 9256 (1938) (remarks of Representative Norton of Michigan).
50. PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1937, at 210 (1941),
quoted in H. METZ, supra note 48.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
52. Id. § 207. The wage and hour provisions are enforced by the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. Id. § 204. Covered employers are
required to keep records, id. § 211(c), and the Administrator is authorized to compel
production of these records. Id. § 209.
53. Id. § 212. Congress thereby removed the albatross of child labor that had hung from
its neck since Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See notes 22-24 and accompanying
text supra.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1970) contains the quasi-criminal sanctions and provides as
follows:
(a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 215 of
this title shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000,
or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. No person shall be
imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the
conviction of such person for a prior offense under this subsection.

The original scope of the FLSA was limited to "employees engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 55 In addition, the
FLSA contained numerous exemptions that removed from its purview
56
significant groups of otherwise eligible employees.
57
The FLSA's validity was challenged in United States v. Darby,
"one of the half-dozen most important cases in the . . . history of
American constitutional law." 58 Darby, a manufacturer who produced
lumber products for sale both inside and outside Georgia, was indicted for
shipping his products in interstate commerce in violation of the FLSA's
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions. His demurrer was sustained by the district court on the ground that the FLSA purported to
regulate manufacturing, an activity that could be regulated only by the
states.

59

A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the district court's rationale and
reversed its decision.' In fashioning the decision, Justice Stone asserted
four major propositions:
(1) The commerce power is plenary and may be exercised to exclude
from commerce those articles which Congress conceives "to be injurious
to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought
61
to regulate their use."
(2) "The power of Congress over interstate commerce. . . extends
to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the
exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the
''62
granted power ....
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970) contains the civil remedies available to aggrieved employees
and provides in part:
(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of
this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may
be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
55. See Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062; and id. § 7, 52 Stat. 1063
(overtime payments). The use of this language demonstrates Congress' desire to enact a wage
law that would pass constitutional muster. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937), see notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra, the Court held that Congress
could regulate those activities that had a "close and intimate" effect on commerce. 301 U.S.
at 41. By extending coverage to only those employees "engaged in commerce or the
production of goods for commerce," Congress insured that the FLSA contained the requisite
nexus to interstate commerce. Congress has since expanded coverage to the practical extent
that any activity merely "affecting commerce" is subject to FLSA requirements. See notes
75-84 and accompanying text infra.
56. The following original exemptions from the FLSA were important: the administrative, executive and professional exemption, Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 13(a)(1), 52 Stat.
1067; the agricultural exemption, id. § 13(a)(6); the retail and service trade exemption, Id. §
13(a)(2); and the public employment exemption, id. § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060.
57. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
58.

P. BENSON, note 9 supra at 89.

59. United States v. F.W. Darby Lumber Co., 32 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Ga. 1940).
60. The unanimity of the Darby Court is explained by the fact that by 1941, Justices
Sutherland, McReynolds, Van Devanter and Butler, the four Justices who comprised the
laissez-faire bloc on the Bench, had either retired or passed away and their successors did not
share their conservative philosophy. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy (pt. 2), 59 HARV. L. REV. 883, 888 (1946).
61. 312 U.S. at 114.
62. Id.at 118.

(3) Judicial review must cease once the Court finds a rational basis
for the conclusion that a regulated activity affects commerce and is
satisfied that the regulation does not "infringe some constitutional
prohibition.' '63
(4) The tenth amendment does not restrict Congress' legitimate
exercise of the commerce power.64 "The amendment," asserted Stone,65
"states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."
This sweeping language made it clear that the Court would no longer place
limits on the commerce power other than the inherent commerce requirement and the affirmative restrictions of other constitutional provisions,
excluding, of course, the tenth amendment.
This last proposition tolled the death knell of dual federalism, and, as
evidence thereof, Darby overruled the cause celebre of dual federalism,
Hammer v. Dagenhart.66 Darby also ushered in an era of judicial restraint
in adjudicating the validity of congressional regulations enacted under the
aegis of the commerce clause.
B.

After Darby: 1941 to 1968

1. JudicialExpansion of FLSA Coverage.- Judicial restraint is the
sine qua non of "new federalism," a term depicting the progressing
concentration of authority in the national government in contrast to the
division of power between the states and the national government under
dual federalism. 67 "New federalism" correctly described the Court's
philosophical attitude toward federal regulation under the commerce
power from Darby until National League of Cities.
Consider, for example, the "line drawing cases" that determined the
scope of the FLSA under a section of the act which provided that "an
employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods
if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing, handling,
transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or in any
process or occupation necessary to the production thereof, in any state.' 68
In A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling69 the Court signalled its intent to give
this language a broad construction. The judicial test to determine whether
an employee was covered by FLSA provisions was held to be whether the
employee had a "close and immediate tie with the process of production
for commerce.''70 It was therefore unnecessary for the employee to
participate directly in the production of the goods to come within the
71
FLSA's purview.
63.

312 U.S. at 115.

64.
65.

Id. at 124.
Id.

66.
67.

Id. at 116-17.
B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 163-64.

68.

29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1970) (emphasis added). See P. BENSON, supra note 9, at 129-39

(general discussion of cases involving § 203(j).
69. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).

70.

Id. at 525.

71.

Id. at 526. Thus, the Court in Kirschbaum held that FLSA coverage included

There followed Kirschbaum a series of cases 72 that refined its "close

and immediate tie" and "necessary occupation" language so that by 1946
the Supreme Court had clearly extended the FLSA's wage and hours
protection to its built-in limits. The FLSA's reach, however, soon proved

to be too short. Millions of employees remained outside the FLSA's
protective cloak. 73 Furthermore, as Congress increased the statutory
minimum wage, the gap between the earnings of employees protected by
the FLSA and those to whom it did not apply widened.74 Surely, the
FLSA's self-proclaimed purpose-to ensure all working men and women a

fair day's pay-was not being served when millions of workers were
denied coverage because Congress had failed to extend the scope of the Act
to the outer limits of the commerce power.

2. Legislative Expansion of FLSA Coverage.-In 1961 Congress
finally yielded to the requests of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and
extended FLSA protection75 to 4.1 million theretofore uncovered employ-

ees.7 6 This legislation signalled the beginning of "a consistent trend of
77
unrelenting expansion of the Act's protection to employees."
The vehicle of this extension was the concept of "enterprise coverage," '78 which brought within the ambit of the Act not only employees
79
directly engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce

but also persons employed in "enterprises" engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce.8 0 "Enterprise coverage" did not,
employees who were engaged in the maintenance and operation of a building in which the
tenants were admittedly producing goods for interstate commerce. Id. at 524.
72. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943) (sustaining FLSA protection
of maintenance employees working on a toll road and drawbridge over a navigable waterway);
Bordon Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945) (sustaining FLSA coverage of maintenance
employees in an office building occupied largely by executive and administrative personnel of
an interstate producer of dairy products); Roland Electrical Co. V. Walling, 326 U.S. 657
(1946) (sustaining FLSA coverage of employees engaged in repairing and rebuilding electric
motors and installing electrical wiring for commercial and industrial users, most of whom
produced goods that moved in commerce); Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327
U.S. 173 (1946) (sustaining FLSA coverage of employees of an independent contractor
engaged in cleaning and maintaining windows for industrial plants that produced goods for
interstate commerce); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (sustaining
FLSA coverage of employees of a newspaper whose out of state circulation totaled 45
copies); D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946) (sustaining FLSA coverage of
maintenance employees in a building where tenants worked on goods and returned them in
intrastate commerce to manufacturers who subsequently shipped the goods to other states).
73. "Of the total of approximately 45 million wage and salary workers (excluding
government employees and executive, administrative, and professional employees) in the
United States, only about 24 million [were] protected by the minimum wage provisions of the
act." S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1stSess.-(1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1620, 1625.

74. Id.
75. Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 201,
203-08, 212-17 (1958).
76. S.REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1620, 1643.

77. Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAMi L. REV. 607,
632 (1972).
78. For a detailed discussion of FLSA coverage under the "enterprise" concept, see
Player, Enterprise Coverage under the FLSA: An Assessment of the First Generation, 28
VAND. L. REV. 283 (1975).

79.
80.

See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.-(1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEws 1620, 1663.

however, extend wage and hour protection to all employees of an "enterprise" as that term is commonly used. The statutory "enterprises"

included in the 1961 amendments were of five specific types, encompassing employees who were engaged in commerce, or in the production of

goods for commerce, or persons employed in "handling, selling or
otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced for
commerce by any person." 8 1 In addition, each type of statutory enterprise
was qualified by threshold dollar requirements pertaining to gross volume
of sales and receipts to ensure that only those enterprises that exerted some
82
impact on interstate commerce were subject to FLSA provisions.
The coverage of the FLSA was again expanded in 1966. 83 The largest

extension in terms of newly covered employees was effectuated by a
reduction in the dollar thresholds for the five types of enterprises

established by the 1961 amendments. 84 More significant than this expansion, however, was the partial diminution of the exempt status theretofore
accorded state and local governments.85 The 1966 amendments provided
FLSA coverage to state and local government employees working in
86
hospitals, schools and local transit operations.
C.

Maryland v. Wirtz: New Federalism Reasserted

1. The Constitutionalityof the "Enterprise" Concept.-The limited extension by the 1966 amendments of fair labor standards to a
relatively small number of state and local government employees 87 provided the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine
the constitutionality of the "enterprise concept." 88 On the whole the states
81. Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2, 75 Stat. 66.
82. The following five types of enterprises were defined by the subsection: (I) retail and
service enterprises having gross annual sales of at least $1 million and purchases of at least
$250,000 worth of goods that have moved in commerce; (2) local transit enterprises having an
annual gross volume of sales of $1 million; (3) any enterprise in the construction business
having an annual gross volume of at least $350,000; (4) any gasoline service establishment
having an annual gross volume of sales of at least $250,000; and (5)any establishment of any
enterprise not included herein having an annual gross volume of sales of at least $1 million. Id.
83. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Act of September 23, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830, amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205-07, 212-14, 216, 218 (1964).
84. It was estimated that coverage would be provided to an additional 5.8 million
employees by the reduction in dollar thresholds. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.(1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3002, 3003.
85. Prior to the 1966 amendments the FLSA had provided that "Employer" includes
"any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to any
employee but shall not include the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State
.
of .Act
June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (emphasis added).
86. This was accomplished in two ways: (I) the FLSA was amended to include a state or
a political subdivision thereof as an employer "with respect to its employees employed in any
hospital or related institution, school for physically or mentally handicapped or gifted
children, or institution of higher education ....

" S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d

Sess.-(1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3028; and (2) the above
institutions were included in the types of "enterprises" subject to the provisions of the FLSA
as enumerated in section 102 of the 1966 amendments. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
87. Of the 7.2 million otherwise eligible public employees, 1.4 million were brought
under the FLSA's protective cloak by the 1966 amendments. S. REP. No. 1487,89th Cong., 2d
Sess. - (1) (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3002, 3003.
88. The constitutionality of the enterprise concept had been sustained in two district
court cases. See Wirtz v. Edisto Farms Dairy, 242 F. Supp. I (E.D.S.C. 1965); Wirtz v. Mayer
Construction Co., 291 F. Supp. 514 (D.N.J. 1968).

had not greeted the 1966 amendments favorably, and a suit was filed by
Maryland to enjoin enforcement of the FLSA insofar as it applied to
schools and hospitals operated by the states or their subdivisions. A divided
district court declined to grant the injunction, 89 and Maryland, joined by
twenty-seven other states 90 and one school district, 9' appealed to the

United States Supreme Court.
The threshold question raised by Maryland was whether the original
expansion provided by the concept of "enterprise coverage" 92 was within
the authority of Congress under the commerce clause. The Court held on
two grounds that the enterprise concept was a permissible avenue for the
extension of federal regulation of the terms of employment. 9

First, the "competition" theory, 94 which sanctions congressional
regulation of business activities that have the potential for disrupting
commerce through unfair competition, 95 supported the validity of the

enterprise formula. In Wirtz the Court concluded that a company's
competitive position was affected by all its significant labor costs, includ-

ing the wages of those not involved in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce. Therefore, Congress did have the constitutional

authority to regulate the wages and hours of "enterprise" employees.
Second, the enterprise concept was upheld on the basis of the "labor
dispute" theory. 96 The Court noted that "there is a basis in logic and

experience for the conclusion that substandard labor conditions among any
group of employees, whether or not they are personally engaged in
commerce or production, may lead to strife disrupting an entire enter-

prise. "9 Since such labor discontent may affect commerce, regulation of
the wages and hours of "enterprise" employees was within the commerce

power of Congress.
2.

The Constitutionality of the Public Employment Extension.-

After satisfying itself that Congress had a rational basis for extending
FLSA coverage to public employees, 9 8 the Court addressed Maryland's
89. Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967). For a critical analysis of the
district court's decision, see 66 MICH: L. REv. 750 (1968); 43 N. D. LAW. 414 (1968); 14 WAYNE
L. REV. 627 (1968).

90. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.
91. Fort Worth Independent School District. It should also be noted that the AFL-CIO
and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) joined
Wirtz, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.
92. See notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra.
93. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
94. The "competition theory" was recognized in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941). There the Court held that elimination of unfair competition wrought by substandard
labor conditions was a legitimate aim of congressional exercise of the commerce power. Id. at
122.
95. 392 U.S. at 190.
96. Id.at 192.
97. Id.
98. The rational basis for asserting that educational and health institutions exert a

second claim that the tenth amendment precluded federal regulation of
state and local government employment practices. Maryland had premised
its argument on two assumptions: (1) that the power to regulate commerce
is no greater than the power to tax; and (2) that federal regulation of state

operations pursuant to the commerce clause has the same destructive effect
on the state's autonomy as does taxation of those operations. Therefore,
Maryland's counsel reasoned, since Congress may not tax essential state
governmental functions such as medical care and education, it cannot
regulate those functions under the aegis of the commerce clause. 99 The
court found this argument untenable. Writing for the majority, Justice

Harlan asserted that although a state's traditional activities mark "the
boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power . . ., there is no
such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce." 100 Simply

stated, the Court's position was that a valid general regulation of commerce
does not cease to be a regulation of commerce because a state is involved.

Justice Harlan concluded that the Court "will not carve up the commerce
power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce
from private businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be run
by the States for the benefit of their citizens." 10 1 Thus the new federalism

so forcefully asserted by Justice Stone in 1941 in Darby still enjoyed the
Court's approbation in 1968.
3. The Wirtz Dissent: The State Sovereignty FoundationLaid.The approval of new federalism under the circumstances of Wirtz was not
unanimous as it had been in Darby. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice
Stewart, wrote a biting dissent in which he characterized the majority's

decision as "an exercise in semantics"

102 that

was "not consistent with our

substantial effect on commerce was the amount of money they spend on goods that move in
interstate commerce. It was stipulated that Maryland's public school system alone spent over
$7 million on interstate purchases in 1965. Furthermore, 55% of the expenditures on drugs and
hospital equipment by eight Maryland state hospitals were out of state purchases. Similar
figures were presented for Ohio and Texas. Thus, in accordance with the "labor dispute"
theory, strikes and work stoppages would obviously interrupt and burden commerce. 392
U.S. at 194-95.
99. See Brief for Appellant at 56-68, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
100. 392 U.S. at 198, quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936)
(state-run railroad held subject to congressional regulation under the Safety Appliance Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 1-43 (1972)).
101. 392 U.S. at 198-99. Maryland had also raised two other issues, but the Court found
discussion of them inappropriate in a declaratory judgment proceeding. The first contention
was that the FLSA violated the states' sovereign immunity from suit guaranteed by the
eleventh amendment. In 1973, the Court had resolved this question in favor of the states,
holding that state employees could not sue in federal courts to recover wages due under the
FLSA. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't., 411 U.S. 279 (1973); see 23 CATH. U. L.
REV. 171 (1973) (criticizing the decision). This is not to say, however, that public employees
were without any means of recovering wages due. InBrennan v. Indiana, 517 F.2d. 1179(7th
Cir. 1975), the Seventh Circuit held that the eleventh amendment did not bar the Secretary of
Labor from bringing suit against a state for alleged FLSA violations.
The final issue raised by Maryland was whether hospitals and schools had "employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, including employees
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced for
commerce by any person ...." 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1965). The Court held that this question
would have to be resolved on the facts of each case.
102. 392 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

constitutional federalism. "103 Douglas conceded that "state government

itself is an 'enterprise' with a very substantial effect on interstate commerce"1 0 4 but asserted that "state sovereignty protected by the tenth

amendment implied that Congress could not 'impair the State's function of
government.' "105 Douglas maintained that federal regulation of state
employees' wages and hours would cause such an impairment and was

therefore unconstitutional.

106

IV.

The States' Rights Revival

A.

Nitional League of Cities v. Usery: The Vindication of the Wirtz
Dissent
The logical implication of the Court's decision in Wirtz was that

Congress could regulate any state activity, provided it had a rational basis
for concluding that the activity affected commerce. Congress took advantage of the import of Wirtz and completely eliminated the special exemption previously afforded states and their political subdivisions, thus impre-

ssing upon almost all public employment minimum wage and maximum
07
hour requirements. 1

Again the states and cities challenged this federal intrusion on their
sovereign functions. Suit was instituted against the Secretary of Labor in

the District Court for the District of Columbia by the National League of
Cities, the National Governor's Conference, nineteen states l08 and four
cities, 109 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against application of the
amendment to public employes. A three judge panel, feeling itself constrained by the Wirtz precedent, granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss
103. Id.
104. Id. at 204.
105. Id. at 205, quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
106. 392 U.S. at 205. Compare Justice Douglas' dissent in Wirtz with Rehnquist's
opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976), discussed at notes 114-31
and accompanying text infra.
107. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 58, amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970). The governmental exemption was
eliminated by defining "employer" to include a "public agency," 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d)
(Supp. 1976), and by expanding the definition of "enterprises engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce" to encompass "an activity of a public agency," 29
U.S.C.A. § 203(s)(5) (Supp. 1976). A "public agency" is defined as "the Government of the
United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency of the
United States (including the United States Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission), a
State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." 29
U.S.C.A. § 203(x) (Supp. 1976). Five million previously uncovered public employees were

brought within the aegis of the Act by this amendment. H.R.REP. No. 93-913, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess.--(1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2837.
108. Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Washington.
Alabama, Colorado and Michigan filed briefs in support of the 1974 amendments arguing
"that if the challengers win, states could end up competing with each other on the basis of
lowering the labor standards of employees already on the poverty line with a consequent
reduction in efficiency and in their ability to attract more able individuals." 33 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2061 (1975).

109.

Nashville, Tenn.; Cape Girardeau, Mo.; Lompoc, Cal.; and Salt Lake City, Utah.

the complaint. " 0 An appeal to the United States Supreme Court followed.

There, the claimants declared that "[n]o prior federal legislation [had]
permeated the whole of state and local government on such an intimate,

internal and important subject. No power 'takeover' of this magnitude,
operating directly on state and local governments, has ever been adopted

[by] Congress."" .1 They argued that this raw exercise of legislative power
was precluded by the tenth amendment, which placed an affirmative limit
on the commerce clause when state and local government activities were
involved.
13
12
Five Justices, the four Nixon appointees' and Justice Stewart, 1
found merit in this contention and reversed the district court's judgment, 114 establishing a new precedent for the judicial review of attempts to
regulate local government operations through the commerce power. The
significance of this new precedent warrants a thorough analysis of the

Court's opinion.
1. The "State Sovereignty" Doctrine.-JusticeRehnquist, writing
for the majority, noted at the outset that while the commerce clause is a

grant of plenary authority to the Congress, it is subject to constitutional
restrictions, such as the sixth amendment right to a jury trial1 15 and the fifth
amendment right of due process." 6 The question here was whether the
tenth amendment placed a similar restriction on the exercise of the power to
regulate commerce.
Rehnquist responded affirmatively." 7 The rationale for this response

was provided by the "state sovereignty" doctrine,"

8

which is premised

upon the assumption that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Congress." 1 9 A
state's determination of its employees' wages and hours, Rehnquist
asserted, was an "attribute of state sovereignty,"' 120 and the question
110. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
111. 33 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2061 (1975) (quoting appellant's argument in National
League of Cities).
112. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist had replaced
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Harlan and Fortas. It is a safe generalization that the
successors take a more conservative, states' rights stance toward federal regulation of state
activities. The change in the composition of the Court since Wirtz perhaps best explains this
judicial turnaround.
113. Justice Stewart's position here is consistent with Justice Douglas' dissent in Wirtz,
in which Stewart joined. See notes 102-06 and accompanying text supra.
114. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2468 (1976) (consolidated with
No. 74-879, California v. Usery).
115. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (death penalty provision of
Federal Kidnapping Law, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1966), enacted under the commerce clause,
invalidated because the death penalty could be imposed only in jury trials).
116. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (presumption [in Actof July 18, 1956,
Pub. L. No. 84-728, ch. 629, § 106, 70 Stat. 570-71 (repealed 1970)], that a possessor of
marijuana is deemed to know of its unlawful importation, violates due process).
117. 96 S. Ct. at 2470-71.
118. This term is attributable to Justice Brennan. 96 S. Ct. at 2479 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
119. 96 S. Ct. at 2471.
120. Id.

confronting the Court thus narrowed to whether this was an attribute that
could not be impaired by federal regulation. The resolution of this issue
turned on whether the determination of employment terms was essential to
the states' separate and independent existence.1 2 ' After examining the

financial impact that FLSA standards would have on a state's fiscal
posture,I 22 Justice Rehnquist concluded that minimum wage and overtime
payments would so inflate government payrolls that the states would be
placed in the dilemma of either increasing their revenues or reducing their
complement of employees. 23 He also noted that the increased costs would
124
force some states to eliminate important government programs.
That these effects were analogous to those visited upon private
businesses by the FLSA requirements was of no constitutional import,
Rehnquist asserted, because "a State is not merely a factor in the 'shifting
economic arrangements' of the private sector of the economy . . . but is

itself a coordinate element in the system established by the framers for
governing our federal union." 125 The FLSA requirements would undeniably alter or displace the states' abilities to structure employer-employee
relationships in uniquely governmental activities, such as fire prevention
and police protection, traditional functions of state and local governments.
Rehnquist concluded that "[i]f Congress may withdraw from the States the

authority to make those fundamental employment decisions upon which
their systems for performance of these functions must rest, . . . there
26
would be little left of the States' 'separate and independent existence'."
He therefore held that "insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
121.

Id.

122. Nashville averred that FLSA provisions would increase its costs of providing police
and fire protection by $938,000 annually. Cape Girardeau, Mo., alleged that its annual fire
protection budget might have to be increased by $150,000. Arizona predicted an increase in
labor costs of $2 1/2
million and California estimated that FLSA standards would necessitate
an $8 million to $16 million increase in its annual budget. 96 S. Ct. at 2471.
These figures may be somewhat misleading. Jerry Wurf, President of AFSCME, in a
statement filed in May 1971 with the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor for inclusion in hearings on H.R. 7130, a proposal to
amend the FLSA, asserted that FLSA standards would increase the states' weekly wage bill
by 1.1%. 51 CONG. DIG. 124 (1972). See also H.R. REP. No. 93-913, 93rd Cong. 2d
Sess.-(1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2838 (citing cost

estimates that suggest FLSA financial impact on the states would not be substantial).
123. 96 S. Ct. at 2472. Judge Northrop for the Maryland District Court in his dissenting
opinion in Wirtz catalogued the forced decisions imposed on the states by federal minimum
wage-maximum hour standards as follows:
1. to increase taxes (an impossibility in some of the political subdivisions
without a state constitutional amendment); or
2. to curtail the extent and calibre of services in the public hospitals and
educational and related institutions of the state; or
3. to reduce indispensable services in other governmental activities to meet
the budgets of those activities favored by the United States Congress; or
4. to refrain from entering new fields of governmental activity necessitated
by changing social conditions.
Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 853 (D. Md. 1967).
124. California alleged that it had cut back its highway patrol training program from 2,080
hours to only 960 hours because of FLSA overtime requirements. 96 S. Ct. at 2472.
125. 96 S. Ct. at 2472-73.
126. Id. at 2474.

areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
'
authority granted Congress by [the commerce clause]." 127
Because Wirtz was factually indistinguishable from NationalLeague
of Cities in that they both involved federal regulation of "an integral

portion of those governmental services which the States and their political
subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens," 12 8 it was overruled. Rehnquist argued that Wirtz had relied on erroneous dicta' 29 from

United States v. California,130 a 1936 case that had sustained federal
regulation of a state-operated railroad. Congress, he reasserted, "may not
exercise [the power to regulate commerce] so as to force directly upon the
States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be made."131

Justice Blackmun, although joining in Rehnquist's opinion, was
troubled by "certain possible implications" of the decision upon other
federal regulations of state activities under the aegis of the commerce
power. He therefore qualified his adherence to the state sovereignty

doctrine by interpreting it so as not to preclude "federal power in areas
such as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demon-

strably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal
standards would be essential." 13' 2
2. The Dissents: A Reaffirmation of the Principles of New
Federalism.- Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices White and

Marshall, objected to the majority's "novel state sovereignty doctrine" on
three grounds. First, he objected to the Court's abandonment of stare
decisis. He reasserted the tenet of new federalism that the power to regulate

commerce is not limited by any notion of state sovereignty. This conclusion, Brennan maintained, is dictated by an "unbroken" line of precedents
127. Id. (emphasis added). Rehnquist catalogued the following as traditional government functions: fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation. Id. at 2474. He cautioned, however, that this list was not exhaustive, leaving the
door open to additional litigation involving the issue whether a given function is traditionally
performed by state and local governments. Id. at 2474 n. 16.
128. Id. at 2476.
129. Id. at 2475.
130. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
131. 96S. Ct. at 2476.
132. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's approach
may thus assuage the environmentalists' fears concerning the validity of transportation
control regulations promulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency pursuant to the legislative mandate given him by the 1970 amendments to the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571(1970). These regulations were challenged in four states, and in
three of those states they were invalidated. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. granted, No. 75-960 (1976) Term); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971
(D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, No. 75-1055 (1976) Term); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. granted, No. 75-909 (1976 Term). The Administrator has appealed these
decisions and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, thus affording Blackmun the chance
to apply his "demonstrably greater interest" test and giving Justice Rehnquist an opportunity
to refine the state sovereignty doctrine.
Blackmun's position is noteworthy in that it suggests the possibility of equivocation in
future challenges to commerce clause regulations of state and local government activities.
Judicial equivocation was a hallmark of dual federalism. See generally E. CORWIN, supra note
9, at 253-68.

that the majority had now discarded.' 3 3 Second, Brennan criticized the
majority for its repudiation of judicial restraint to invalidate "a congressional judgment with which they disagree." 134 The judiciary's proper role
in reviewing congressional exercises of the commerce power, he reminded
the Court, is to determine whether or not "Congress has not unreasonably
regulated a subject matter of 'commerce."' ' 135 Once it is found that the
regulation is "reasonable" the judicial role must end. "The Court,"
Brennan added, "is simply not at liberty to erect a mirror of its own
conception of a desirable governmental structure." 136 He emphasized that
the political, not the adjudicative, process was the proper means for
distributing powers in a federal system. 37
Finally, Justice Brennan attacked the substance of the state sovereignty doctrine as being "conceptually unworkable." To illustrate this criticism, Brennan contrasted the Court's treatment of Wirtz with its treatment
of Fry v. United States. 138 The majority had overruled Wirtz because it had
sanctioned a regulation directed against the states as states that impaired
their ability to structure integral and traditional governmental functionsclearly an impermissible exercise of the commerce power under the state
sovereignty doctrine. In Fry, decided in 1975 by a seven to two vote, the
Court, relying on Writz, rejected Ohio's contention that the application to
state employees of the Economic Stabilization Act, 139 pursuant to which
the President had ordered a "wage freeze," interfered with sovereign state
functions and was therefore unconstitutional." 0 Yet, despite the fact that
the wage freeze as applied to state employees was sustained on the basis of
Wirtz, now gone the way of all flesh, the majority in NationalLeague of
Cities surprisingly found their decision to be "quite consistent" with Fry.
This conclusion was based upon three factors allegedly distinguishing the
statute in Fry from the statutes in Wirtz and NationalLeague of Cities: (1)
the impairment of wage determination was of limited duration; (2) the
wage freeze did not displace state choices as to how governmental
programs should be structured; and (3) the wage freeze reduced budget
pressures rather than increasing them.'41
Justice Brennan argued that it was "sophistry to say the Economic
Stabilization Act 'displaced no state choices . . . but that the 1974
amendments do.' "142 He continued, "it is absurd to suggest that there is a
133. 96 S. Ct. at 2481 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id.at 2478.
136. Id. at 2485.

137.
that the
States.
Id.
138.
139.

Id. at2486. Brennan stated that "[jiudicial
restraint inthis area merely recognizes
political
branches of our Government are structured to protect the interests of the
. .and that the States are fully able to protect their own interests in the premises."
421 U.S. 542 (1975).
Title IIof the Act of Aug.15, 1970, Pub. L.No.91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, 12

U. S.C. § 1904 (1970) (expired 1974).
140. 421 U.S. at548.

141. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2474-75 (1976).
142. Id. at 2484 (Brennan,J.,dissenting).

constitutionally significant distinction between curbs against increasing
wages and curbs against paying wages lower than the federal
minimum.' ' 143 In short, he asserted that the state sovereignty doctrine,
stripped of its states' rights rhetoric, is nothing more than a "thinly veiled
rationalization for judicial supervision of a policy judgment that our system
of government reserves to Congress." 144 Brennan characterized the implications of the state sovereignty doctrine as "a catastrophic judicial body
blow at Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" 145 and warned that
"there is an ominous portent of disruption of our constitutional structure
implicit in today's mischievous decision."146
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, lamented the majority's disregard for state decisis. In an opinion that epitomized judicial restraint, he
noted that, although he disagreed with the wisdom of regulating wages,
there was no precedent upon which to base the conclusion that the federal
government's regulation of that subject pursuant to the commerce power
47
was subject to a tenth amendment limitation.1
3. The State Sovereignty DoctrineAssessed. -National League of
Cities has fabricated a new method for reviewing commerce power
regulations of state functions-the state sovereignty doctrine. This theory
can be summarized as follows: The tenth amendment confers upon the
states "attributes of sovereignty" that may not be impaired by congressional exercises of the commerce power. These unimpairable attributes of
sovereignty encompass "traditional governmental functions" that are
"essential" to the state's autonomy.
(a) Judicial review under the state sovereignty doctrine.-Which functions are traditional and, of those that are, which are essential to state
autonomy, is not clear. What is clear, however, is that the state sovereignty
doctrine as expressed in National League of Cities expands the judicial
role in reviewing congressional enactments that regulate state activities
under the aegis of the commerce clause. That role, as viewed by the
National League of Cities majority, is to balance the national considerations prompting the federal regulation against the interference with the
state's freedom to structure its governmental operations. Thus, the state
sovereignty theory enables the Court to enforce its notion of a nationalstate power equilibrium by proscribing regulations that in its opinion do not
override the states' right to be unfettered by federal regulations in the
performance of their traditional governmental functions.
This method of judicial review is reminiscent of the dual federalist
approach towards congressional regulation of the conditions of employ143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 2486.
Id.at 2487.
Id.at 2487-88.
Id. at 2488 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

ment. Both dual federalism and the doctrine of state sovereignty involve a
balancing approach that weighs national interests against local interests.
Under dual federalism, the balancing approach was camouflaged by the
"constitutional principle" that only those activities that "directly" affected commerce were regulable. Under the state sovereignty theory, the
majority's weighing of states' rights against countervailing national considerations is hidden by the newly fashioned principle that the states'
freedom to structure traditional and integral governmental operations may
not be "directly" displaced by Congress' exercise of the commerce power.
Analytically, however, dual federalism and state sovereignty are not
alike. Under dual federalism, the Court strictly construed the term "commerce" and thereby closely circumscribed the area of regulable activities.
Thus the limits of the commerce power were to be found in the commerce
clause itself, and not in the tenth amendment. State sovereignty takes the
opposite approach, interpreting the tenth amendment as affirmatively
14 8
limiting congressional exercise of the commerce power.
(b) The power to tax and the power to regulate commerce.-The idea
that the tenth amendment limits the exercise of a power delegated to the
national government is not new. It has long been recognized that the federal
government may not tax state instrumentalities in a fashion that would
impair their ability to function as separate governmental entities. But
judicial application of this limited concept of state immunity to congressional exercises of the plenary authority under the commerce clause is
unique. To be sure, advocates of states' rights have in the past argued that
the principle of state immunity from federal taxation applies to federal
regulation under the commerce clause as well. But this argument had been
consistently rejected. Thus, Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court
in United States v. California,149 stated that
we ldok to the activities in which the states have traditionally
engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the
federal taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the
plenary power to regulate commerce. The statecan no more deny
the power if its exercise has been authorizedby Congressthan can
an individual.150
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Fry, treated the
italicized statement as something akin to a Pandora's box, which, if
opened, would unleash powers that " 'could devour the essentials of state
sovereignty.' ",151 There is no reason, Rehnquist asserted,
why a State's immunity from the plenary authority of the National Government to tax . . .should have been thought by the
California court to be any higher on the scale of constitutional
148. See,96 S. Ct. at 2482 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
,150. Id. at185 (emphasis added).
151. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 550 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting), quoting
Maryland v.Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Douglas,J.,dissenting).

values than is a State's claim to be free from the imposition of
Congress' plenary authority under the Commerce Clause. Especially is this true because the immunity from taxation has no
explicit constitutional source and appears to rest solely on a
concept of constitutional federalism which should likewise limit
federal power under the Commerce Clause.152
In National League of Cities Rehnquist ended the distinction in the
treatment of the power to tax and the commerce power-traditional
governmental functions can no longer be impaired by the exercise of either.
The lid to the so-called Pandora's box of United States v. California had
been closed.
(c) The "constitutionalization" ofjudge-made law.-To speak in terms
of an unwarranted constitutional distinction only colors the state sovereignty doctrine with constitutionality. The Constitution obviously does not
speak in terms of unimpairable sovereign functions, nor does it provide that
the tenth amendment limits the power to tax state facilities but not the
power to regulate state activities. Those conclusions are based on differing
interpretations of the tenth amendment, the differences being attributable
to the interpreting Justice's concept of the proper national-state power
balance and his view of the role of the judiciary in interpreting legislation
that affects that equilibrium. An interpretation becomes "more sound"
only in that it has been "constitutionalized" 5 3 through subsequent judicial, political and popular ratification. For example, the decision in
Darby'54 that Congress may regulate activities that in some degree affect
commerce has been judicially reaffirmed, 155 legislatively exploited' 5 6 and
popularly approved to the extent that it is now constitutionally unassailable. Contrast, however, the "constitutionalization" of Darby with the
fate of Adkins v. Children'sHospital. 57 Although Adkins was repeatedly
cited by the laissez-faire Court to invalidate state minimum wage laws, it
failed to receive either political or popular approval and, consequently,
was overruled. The contrasting histories of Adkins and Darby also suggest
another important factor in the "constitutionalization" of judicial precedents: the degree to which a particular decision is supported by the nine
Justices at the time the decision was handed down bears a direct relation to
that decision's viability as a constitutional precedent. This proposition is
based on the simple observation that majorities on the bench become
minorities with the passing of time and Presidents. Thus, the larger the
152. 421 U.S. at 553-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. The concept of constitutionalized judicial precedents is an abstraction from the
concept of "institutionalization" as applied by Dorothy James to presidential functions. See
D. JAMES, THE CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENCY (1969). "Constitutionalization" also recognizes
the limited effect of the doctrine of stare decisis in constitutional decisions. See New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. See notes 57-65 and accompanying text supra.
155. Consider, for example, the FLSA "line drawing" cases discussed at note 72 and
accompanying text supra.
156. The concept of "enterprise coverage" evidences legislative reliance on Darby. See
notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra.
157. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See notes 17-20, 34-38 and accompanying text supra.

majority supporting the rule, the more difficult it becomes to negate the
precedent by a change in the Court's membership.
This analysis helps to explain the outcome in National League of
Cities and predict its future. National League of Cities was decided just
eight years after Wirtz, which admittedly presented an almost identical fact
situation. Wirtz, although legislatively ratified in the form of the 1974
amendments, had not received sufficient judicial affirmation to become
"constitutionalized." Furthermore, former President Nixon had seized the
unique opportunity to replace four of the Wirtz majority and thereby turn
the Wirtz minority into a majority that shared his conservative views. 158 In
NationalLeague of Cities the new majority asserted itself through the state
sovereignty doctrine.
B.

Limitations of the State Sovereignty Doctrine

It does not appear, however, that NationalLeague of Cities has set a
devastating precedent with respect to federal regulation of state and local
government activities. This conclusion is based on the practical considerations that the state sovereignty doctrine was promulgated by the barest
majority and that Justice Blackmun qualified his adherence to the doctrine
by stating that he would sustain commerce power regulations in areas in
which the federal interest was "demonstrably greater." This prediction is
also justified by a thorough reading of Rehnquist's opinion in National
League of Cities.
1. Regulations Under the Spending Power.-Justice Rehnquist
made it clear that NationalLeague of Cities did not absolutely preclude the
application of fair labor standards to public employees, intimating that
imposition on the states of FLSA requirements through grants-in-aid may
be permissible. 5 9 This conditional grant approach, through which the
facade of state autonomy is preserved while Congress implements national
policies by subtly coercing the states to take a desired course of action in
exchange for a grant, is sometimes referred to as "cooperative federalism." 16 The earliest example of a cooperative federalist measure was the
158. Nixon's veto of legislation similar to the 1974 FLSA amendments partly on the
ground that he believed itto be an unconstitutional violation of the tenth amendment lends
support to the textual assertion. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1973, at 52, col. 4.
159. Rehnquist hinted that congressional regulations attached to grants-in-aid under the
spending power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1, might be sustained even though they affected
integral operations of state governments. 96 S. Ct. at 2474 n. 17. "Grants-in-aid' is a term
used to define a method of operation whereby funds derived from a tax levied and collected by
one level of government are made available for expenditure and administration by another
level, usually upon a matching basis, for some particular activity, and in accordance with
definite and specific standards and requirements." THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT 493 (1949) [hereinafter

referred to as HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT].
160. According to Corwin, the major postulate of "cooperative federalism" is that "the
National Government and the States are mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism all of whose powers are intended to realize the current purposes of
government according to their applicability to the problem in hand." Corwin, The Passingof
Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1950). Thus, the national government uses its financial
power, which exceeds the states' financial power, to utilize "the wider coercive power of the

1862 land-grant program, which conditioned grants of public lands upon
the states' establishment of colleges teaching agriculture and mechanical
studies. 16 1 Another significant example was the Social Security Act of
1935.162 These cooperative measures have been sustained against the
contention that they are an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to
''coerce and control the states." 163 Today, conditional grants have become
so widespread that they have been described as "part of the warp and
woof" of government."6
The most effective utilization of conditional grants to impose FLSA
requirements on state and local governments would condition the extension
of existing financial grants in certain areas, such as health care, education
and highways, upon state compliance with fair labor standards in those
areas. The states would then be faced with the "choice" between complying with the fair labor standards or maintaining present employment
practices and losing federal assistance. 165 Another means of extending
FLSA protection to public employees would be to establish a general
revenue sharing fund to which the states would have access upon the
adoption of fair labor standards that conform to federal requirements.
The administrative costs of either measure, however, would be
substantial. Compliance with federal standards would require detailed
records in each area in which fair labor standards are imposed. This could
probably be accomplished only by individual department processes rather
than statewide machinery, with duplication of efforts and accordingly high
costs. The imposition of federal minimum wage and maximum hour
standards would thus compel the states to make certain choices in the
structuring of integral government functions and would increase, to some
extent, budget pressures-precisely the effects objected to in National
League of Cities.
In essence, the practical difference between "cooperative" measures
and direct commerce clause regulations insofar as they affect the nationalstate power balance is difficult to discern. It has long been recognized that
conditional grants tend to camouflage the aggrandizement of national
power. As Corwin noted,
States" to effect national objectives. Id. at 20. For a general discussion of "cooperative
federalism," see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 175-78; Mermin, CooperativeFederalism
Again: State and Municipal Legislation Pending Violations of Existing and FutureFederal
Requirements, 57 YALE L.J. 1 (1947).

See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 175-76.
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-1397(f) (Supp. 1976).
163. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 21 at 177, citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619(1937);
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301
U.S. 495 (1937). See also Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n., 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (tenth
amendment does not limit Congress' power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments
to states are disbursed; those terms may prohibit state officials who handle such funds from
engaging in "political activities").
164. HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 159, at 493.
165. The states would have much to lose by not meeting federal employment standards.
Justice Brennan noted that the President's proposed budget recommended $60.5 billion in
federal assistance to the states, exclusive of loans. The states are to receive $716 million for
law enforcement alone. By comparison, the largest estimate of the cost impact of the 1974
amendments was $1 billion. 96 S. Ct. at 2486-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161.

162.

when two cooperate it is the stronger member of the combination
who calls the tunes. Resting as it does primarily on the superior
fiscal resources of the National Government, Cooperative
Federalism has been . . . a short expression for a constantly
increasing concentration of power at Washington in the instigation and supervision of local policies. 166
Yet the majority in National League of Cities intimates that cooperative
federalist measures, which have the same effect as does an exercise of the
commerce power, are permissible under Congress' spending power. Thus,
the Court recognizes an unprecedented constitutional distinction between
federal regulations under the spending power and those under the commerce power.
2. Congressionally Imposed Equal Protection.-The National
League of Cities majority also hinted that equal protection-type regulations
67
would be sustained despite their effect on "integral state functions," 1
and two district courts have factually distinguished National League of
Cities from cases in which federal equal pay and age discrimination
standards were imposed upon state and local government employment.
(a) Equal pay for state employees.-In Christensen v. Iowa 1 68 the
University of Northern Iowa, relying on NationalLeagueof Cities, moved
to dismiss a complaint that alleged that it had violated the FLSA equal pay
provision'69 by paying its female clerical workers less than it paid male
employees who performed comparable work. Iowa argued that the equal
pay provision impaired the state's ability to structure public employment.
The district court held, however, that discrimination in pay was not " 'a
fundamental employment decision' upon which the state's system for
administering public laws and public services rests. Likewise, the ability to
exercise such discrimination is not . . .an attribute of state sovereignty." 7 0 The Court sustained the equal pay provision as a valid exercise of
the commerce power and denied the motion to dismiss.
(b) The Age Discriminationin Employment Act. -In Usery i.SaltLake
17 2
City Board ofEducation, 1'the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
166. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1,21 (1950).
167. The Court remarked: "We express no view as to whether different results might
obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising
authority granted it under. . .§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 96 S. Ct. at2474 n. 17.
168. 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishments ata rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex insuch establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions ....
170. 417 F. Supp. at 425.
171. 45 U.S.L.W. 2155 (D. Utah, Aug. 31, 1976).
172. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970). The purpose of this Act is "to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the

was challenged as an impermissible interference with traditional and
integral state governmental functions. The Utah district court adopted the
approaches of both Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun to sustain the
Act's application to the states as a valid exercise of the commerce power.
Utilizing Justice Blackmun's approach, the Court ruled that the national
interest in preventing arbitrary discrimination in employment on the basis
of age outweighed the state's interest in discriminatory employment
practices. 173 Following Rehnquist's state sovereignty analysis, it found
that the prevention of "arbitrary age discrimination does not 'directly'
displace the state's freedom to structure integral state operations, but at
most indirectly affects those operations while essentially leaving the state's
employment structure intact." 1 74 The Utah court also sustained the Act on
the separate ground that it was a legitimate exercise of the authority granted
Congress by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment 175 to enforce the
substantive equal protection guarantee of section 1176 of that

amendment.
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This reasoning comports with dicta from the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 17 s In Fitzpatrick the Court was confronted with the issue of whether Congress has the power, under the equal
protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, to authorize federal
courts to entertain suits for monetary damages against a State by a citizen of
that State as a means of redressing unlawful employment discrimination.
Significantly, Justice Rehnquist spoke for the Court and held that Congress
does have the power to authorize such suits. In sweeping language,
Rehnquist made it clear that the present Court viewed Congress' power
under section 5 as plenary and that state sovereignty was subordinate
thereto.' 79 Thus, the Court now recognizes a distinction between fourteenth amendment and commerce clause interferences with state autonomy
on which the Constitution is silent. Precedents and logic, however, suggest
that Congress' authority under the commerce clause, in conjunction with
the "necessary and proper" clause, 180 is coextensive with its authority
under the fourteenth amendment.
V.

Conclusion

Minimum wage legislation has once again run up against a constitutional stone wall. To be sure, the state sovereignty wall is not of the same
impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. §621 (1970). Unlawful discriminatory practices are
catalogued at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1970).
173.

45 U.S.L.W. 2155 (D. Utah, Aug. 31, 1976).

174. Id. at 2156.
175. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
176. Section I of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall. . .deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
177. 45 U.S.L.W. 2155, 2156 (D. Utah, Aug. 31, 1976).
178. 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976).
179. Id.at 2670-71.
180. U.S. CONST. art 1. § 8(18).

mortar and blocks as the obstacles that prevented the passage of any
minimum wage law before 1937. Moreover, the Court in NationalLeague
of Cities suggested means by which Congress could scale the wall of state
sovereignty to provide public employees with wage and hours protection. "' But the implications of the state sovereignty doctrine go beyond the
workers denied fair labor standards because it has the potential to remove
from the ambit of the commerce clause governmental entities that perform
functions which are to all intents and purposes identical to regulated private
businesses.
The Court has indicated, however, that it will not carry National
League of Cities to its logical end. Regulations pursuant to the spending
power and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment can be expected to
withstand objections that they violate state sovereignty. In addition, Justice
Blackmun's "demonstrably greater interest" approach indicates that the
state sovereignty doctrine's bark is greater than its bite. But the limits of the
state sovereignty doctrine do not detract from its most pernicious consequence: the repudiation of judicial restraint and longstanding constitutional
principles to reach a result subjectively considered desirable by a majority
of the Court.
We enter, therefore, upon a period of uncertainty and equivocation as
the Court struggles to refine its novel doctrine and at the same time enforce
its concept of a national-state power balance. This struggle may be aptly
resolved if the Court will limit the use of its unprecedented doctrine and
return to the well established principle that the power to regulate commerce
is plenary and unrestrained by any notion of state sovereignty.

THOMAS I. VANASKIE
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See notes 159, 167 and accompanying text supra.

